

The Honorable Benjamin H. Settle

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT TACOMA

IN RE BARRETT BUSINESS SERVICES  
SECURITIES LITIGATION

Case No. 3:14-cv-5884-BHS

**CLASS ACTION**

This Document Relates To:

ALL ACTIONS.

**LEAD COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR  
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND  
REIMBURSEMENT OF LITIGATION  
EXPENSES**

**ORAL ARGUMENT SET**

**HEARING AND NOTING DATE:**

The Hon. Benjamin H. Settle

February 22, 2017

1:30 p.m.

Courtroom E

MOTION FOR FEES AND EXPENSES  
(CASE No. 14-cv-5884-BHS)

LAW OFFICES OF  
**BYRNES KELLER CROMWELL LLP**  
1000 SECOND AVENUE, 38<sup>TH</sup> FLOOR  
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98104  
TELEPHONE: (206) 622-2000  
FACSIMILE: (206) 622-2522

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 20 19 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) .....5, 6, 11

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 22 388 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).....15

19 **STATUTES**

20 15 U.S.C.  
 21 § 78u-4 .....4, 6

1 Pursuant to the Court’s November 7, 2016 Amended Order Preliminarily Approving  
2 Settlement and Providing for Notice (“Preliminary Approval Order,” ECF No. 117), Lead  
3 Counsel Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP (“Bernstein Litowitz”), on behalf of itself  
4 and Liaison Counsel Byrnes Keller Cromwell LLP (“Byrnes Keller”) and additional Plaintiffs’  
5 Counsel Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP (“Wolf Haldenstein”) (collectively, with  
6 Lead Counsel, “Plaintiffs’ Counsel”), submits this motion for an award of attorneys’ fees in the  
7 amount of 22% of the Settlement Fund, and reimbursement of Litigation Expenses in the total  
8 amount of \$114,823.92, plus interest accrued thereon, to be paid from the Settlement Fund.

9 **I. INTRODUCTION**

10 Plaintiffs’ Counsel have succeeded in recovering \$12 million for the benefit of the  
11 Settlement Class. As discussed below, and in the accompanying declarations of Plaintiffs’  
12 Counsel, all of the factors considered by courts within the Ninth Circuit support the request for  
13 attorneys’ fees as a percentage-of-the-fund recovered, in the amount of 22%.<sup>1</sup> The results  
14 obtained by Plaintiffs’ Counsel in the face of the litigation risks are remarkable. The likelihood  
15 of succeeding was highly uncertain. Plaintiffs’ Counsel nevertheless undertook this  
16 representation on a contingency basis, with no guarantee of success or recovery. They faced  
17 substantial risks overcoming Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Although Plaintiffs’ Counsel were  
18 able to conduct a thorough investigation sufficient to draft a detailed Complaint that they believe  
19 satisfied the heightened pleading standard of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of  
20 1995 (the “PSLRA”), Defendants assuredly would have challenged the allegations again at both  
21 summary judgment and trial. Even if all claims had survived the pleading and summary  
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23 <sup>1</sup> Lead Counsel respectfully refers the Court to the accompanying Declaration of Timothy A.  
24 DeLange in Support of Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Plan of Allocation, and  
25 Lead Counsel’s Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation  
26 Expenses (“DeLange Declaration”), for a detailed description of the Action, the negotiations  
27 leading to the Settlement, the risks of litigation, the reasons for the Settlement, and further  
support for the request for attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of Litigation Expenses. As  
discussed below, declarations of the three Plaintiffs’ Counsel are also attached to the DeLange  
Declaration as Exhibits 4-A, 4-B, and 4-C.

1 judgment stages, Plaintiffs' Counsel faced risks proving falsity, scienter, and loss causation;  
2 defeating defenses; demonstrating damages; and establishing that a class action was appropriate  
3 for litigation purposes. Even if Plaintiffs had wholly succeeded through motions, trial, and  
4 appeals, there was a real risk in actually collecting a substantial judgment.

5 As detailed in the accompanying DeLange Declaration, Plaintiffs' Counsel vigorously  
6 pursued this litigation. Among other things, Plaintiffs' Counsel conducted a comprehensive  
7 investigation to prepare the consolidated complaints, including review and analysis of Barrett's  
8 press releases and other public statements and public filings with the U.S. Securities and  
9 Exchange Commission ("SEC") filings, research and other reports by securities and financial  
10 analysts covering Barrett and its business, news articles and other media reports about Barrett,  
11 and pricing, trading, and other data concerning Barrett common stock. Plaintiffs' Counsel  
12 identified and interviewed numerous percipient witnesses, including six former Barrett  
13 employees who provided detailed information in the Complaint. Plaintiffs' Counsel also  
14 monitored and analyzed additional information that was revealed throughout the litigation, and  
15 when appropriate sought and obtained leave to amend the complaints to add the new  
16 information. *See* DeLange Decl. Section II.

17 Plaintiffs' Counsel opposed Defendants' various rounds of motions to dismiss; engaged  
18 and consulted with experts; researched the law applicable to the claims and potential defenses;  
19 fully analyzed the available insurance policies and Defendants' ability to fund a recovery; and  
20 engaged in a thorough mediation process with experienced defense counsel and successfully  
21 negotiated a favorable settlement. *See id.*

22 Given the substantial recovery obtained for the Settlement Class, the complexity and  
23 amount of work involved, the skill and expertise required, and the significant risks that Lead  
24 Counsel undertook, the requested award of 22% of the Settlement Amount is fair and reasonable.  
25 It is below the Ninth Circuit's 25% "benchmark," and consistent with, or less than, fee awards in  
26 other similar cases. A lodestar cross-check confirms that the requested fee, which represents a  
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1 multiplier of 2.5, is fair and reasonable. Moreover, the institutional investor Plaintiffs approve  
2 the fairness and reasonableness of the requested fee. *See id.* ¶91.

3 As required by the Court’s November 7, 2016 Preliminary Approval Order, the Court-  
4 approved Notice was mailed to potential Settlement Class Members and their brokers and  
5 nominees beginning on November 21, 2016. *See* Declaration of Jennifer M. Bareither re  
6 Notice Dissemination and Publication (“Bareither Decl.”), attached as Exhibit 2 to the  
7 DeLange Decl. Over 22,899 Notices have been sent to potential Settlement Class Members and  
8 their broker and nominees. *See id.* ¶¶2-11. In addition, the Court-approved Summary Notice  
9 was published in the *Investor’s Business Daily* and over the *PR Newswire* on  
10 November 28, 2016. *See id.* ¶12. Information regarding the Settlement has been made available  
11 through a toll-free telephone number and posted on the website established by the Claims  
12 Administrator specifically for this Settlement. *See id.* ¶¶13-14. The Notice advised Settlement  
13 Class Members that Lead Counsel would seek attorneys’ fees on behalf of all Plaintiffs’ Counsel  
14 in an amount not to exceed 22% of the Settlement Amount, and reimbursement of Litigation  
15 Expenses in an amount not to exceed \$400,000. *See* Exhibit A to the Bareither Decl. ¶¶5, 67.

16 Pursuant to the Preliminary Approval Order, the deadline for Settlement Class Members  
17 to file any objection to Lead Counsel’s fee and expense request is February 1, 2017. To date  
18 there are no objections.<sup>2</sup>

19 For the reasons set forth below, Lead Counsel respectfully requests that the Court  
20 approve its motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses.

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27 <sup>2</sup> If any objections are received, Lead Counsel will address them in the reply papers to be filed  
on February 15, 2017.

1 **II. THE REQUESTED FEES ARE FAIR AND REASONABLE**

2 **A. An Award Of Attorneys' Fees From**  
 3 **The Common Fund Obtained Is Appropriate**

4 The Supreme Court has recognized that “a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common  
 5 fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable  
 6 attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.” *Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert*, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980).  
 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that private securities actions, such as the instant  
 8 Action, are “a most effective weapon” and “an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and  
 9 civil enforcement actions” brought by the SEC. *See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.*,  
 10 551 U.S. 308, 313, 318 (2007). The PSLRA also authorizes courts to award attorneys’ fees and  
 11 expenses to counsel for the plaintiff class provided the award does not exceed a reasonable  
 12 percentage of the amount of damages paid to the class. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(6).

13 The Ninth Circuit has expressly approved the percentage-of-recovery approach, which  
 14 has become the prevailing method for awarding fees in common fund cases in the Ninth Circuit.  
 15 *See, e.g., Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 331 Fed. App’x 452, 456-57 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpubl.)  
 16 (overruling objection based on use of percentage-of-the-fund approach); *In re Omnivision*  
 17 *Techs., Inc.*, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (recognizing that the “use of the  
 18 percentage method in common fund cases appears to be [the] dominant” method for determining  
 19 attorneys’ fees).

20 The percentage-of-recovery method also decreases the burden imposed on courts by  
 21 eliminating a detailed and time-consuming lodestar analysis. *See In re Apple iPhone/iPod*  
 22 *Warranty Litig.*, 40 F. Supp. 3d 1176, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2014); *In re Activision Sec. Litig.*, 723 F.  
 23 Supp. 1373, 1378-79 (N.D. Cal. 1989). Rather than engaging in a full-blown lodestar analysis,  
 24 courts employing the percentage method sometimes use a less rigorous “lodestar cross-check” on  
 25 the reasonableness of the requested fee. *See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043,  
 26 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming use of percentage method and application of lodestar method as a  
 27 cross-check); *Vincent v. Reser*, 2013 WL 621865, at \*5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2013) (using



percentage method with lodestar cross-check); *In re Nuvelo, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2011 WL 2650592, at \*3 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2011) (same). Regardless of which method is utilized, the fees awarded must be fair and reasonable under the circumstances of a particular case. *See In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig.* (“WPPSS”), 19 F.3d 1291, 1295 (9th Cir. 1994).

**B. Factors Considered By Courts In The Ninth Circuit Support Approval Of The Requested Fee As Fair And Reasonable**

Courts in the Ninth Circuit consider the following factors when determining whether a fee is fair and reasonable: (1) the results achieved; (2) the risks of litigation; (3) the skill required and quality of work; (4) the contingent nature of the fee and financial burden carried by the plaintiffs; (5) awards made in similar cases; (6) the reaction of the class; and (7) the amount of a lodestar cross-check. *See Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1048-50; *Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1046-48. Application of each of these factors here confirms that the requested fee of 22% is fair and reasonable.

**1. The Results Achieved, In The Face Of Significant Risks, Support The Requested Fee**

Courts have consistently recognized that the settlement achieved is an important factor to consider in determining an appropriate fee award. *See, e.g., Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1046; *see also Glass*, 331 Fed. App’x at 456-57. Here, Plaintiffs’ Counsel succeeded in obtaining a \$12 million cash Settlement for the Settlement Class. This achievement was the result of Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s vigorous investigation, prosecution and settlement negotiations in the face of formidable risks. Consequently, the \$12 million recovered on behalf of the Settlement Class represents a substantial achievement that weighs in favor of granting the 22% fee.

Risk that continued litigation might result in the Settlement Class (and Plaintiffs’ Counsel) not receiving any recovery at all is another important factor in determining a fair fee award. *See, e.g., In re Heritage Bond Litig.*, 2005 WL 1594389, at \*14 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) (“The risks assumed by Class Counsel, particularly the risk of non-payment or

1 reimbursement of expenses, is a factor in determining counsel’s proper fee award.”); *Omnivision*,  
2 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1047; *WPPSS*, 19 F.3d at 1299-301.

3 If this Action had proceeded, numerous material uncertainties existed. The fraud alleged  
4 in this case centered around Barrett and its senior officers allegedly making a series of materially  
5 misleading statements and omissions about the true level of Barrett’s workers’ compensation  
6 claims and the Company’s workers’ compensation reserve. For example, early in the Settlement  
7 Class Period, Defendants publicly represented to investors that workers’ compensation reserves  
8 were “strengthened,” while allegedly hiding the Company’s true exposure. Specifically, as later  
9 confirmed, Barrett began to pay “more dollars out sooner” on claims from prior periods and  
10 “put[] up dollars on claims quicker.” This process, which Defendants allegedly misleadingly  
11 referred to as “reserve strengthening,” caused a substantial disruption in the actuarial data related  
12 to the Company’s workers’ compensation claims. Additionally, the rapid transfer of reserve  
13 dollars to specifically identified open claims skewed the ratios between the various components  
14 of the workers’ compensation reserve. Nevertheless, Defendants falsely assured investors that  
15 the reserve was “conservative,” “adequate,” “reasonable and objective,” that it represented  
16 management’s “best estimate,” and was the result of an “informed judgment.”

17 The most immediate risk Plaintiffs faced was surviving Defendants’ motions to dismiss  
18 that were pending when the Settlement was reached. To survive a motion to dismiss, a securities  
19 fraud complaint must (i) meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b); (ii) contain  
20 sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (*Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S.  
21 662-63 (2009)); and (iii) “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the  
22 defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). If Defendants’  
23 motions to dismiss were granted with prejudice, the case would have been dismissed in its  
24 entirety without any recovery.

25 As detailed in the DeLange Declaration, Plaintiffs’ Counsel responded in detail to  
26 Defendants’ arguments in their motions to dismiss that Plaintiffs failed to identify a material  
27 omission or misrepresentation of fact in connection with the workers’ compensation reserve.

1 DeLange Decl. ¶¶48-51. Even assuming that Plaintiffs satisfied the heightened pleading  
 2 standards of the PSLRA, Defendants undoubtedly would have continued to press those and other  
 3 arguments at summary judgment or trial, and would have challenged the existence and amount of  
 4 damages. While Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs' Counsel believe that Plaintiffs' claims are strong and  
 5 that they would be able to develop the evidence needed to prevail at summary judgment and trial,  
 6 they nonetheless recognize that if the Court or the jury were to accept any of Defendants'  
 7 arguments or defenses, either at the pleading stage, summary judgment or at trial, it would  
 8 eliminate or dramatically limit any potential recovery. These risks were more acute in this case  
 9 because of the complex nature of accounting for workers' compensation reserves. Whether a  
 10 jury would appreciate the nuances that both sides would be arguing was uncertain. *Id.* ¶¶52-54.

11 The Settlement, which represents at least 8.3% of maximum recoverable damages, even  
 12 assuming Plaintiffs' Counsel were wholly successful in proving Plaintiffs' claims through trial  
 13 and appeal, far exceeds the median recovery as a percentage of estimated damages.<sup>3</sup>

14 Moreover, Plaintiffs' Counsel monitored Barrett's financial condition and received  
 15 financial information from Barrett. Based on their analysis, Plaintiffs' Counsel understood that  
 16 there was a risk that Barrett would be unable to satisfy a substantial judgment that could be  
 17 potentially obtained years in the future, and that the available insurance proceeds were

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 19 <sup>3</sup> Plaintiffs' Counsel engaged a consultant to assist in estimating potentially recoverable  
 20 damages. Estimating aggregate damages can be challenging due to, among other things,  
 21 assumptions that must be made regarding trading activity. The estimate of potential maximum  
 22 recoverable damages in this case, assuming that Plaintiffs wholly prevailed on all claims and  
 23 overcame all defenses, was at most approximately \$145 million. But that number would be  
 24 reduced or eliminated entirely if the Court or jury accepted some or all of Defendants' defenses.  
 25 *Id.* ¶53. Even before accounting for Defendants' causation arguments and other defenses, the  
 26 recovery of approximately 8.3% of the maximum recoverable damages is significantly higher  
 27 than the 1.8% median settlement recovery as a percentage of estimated damages in securities  
 class actions in 2015, as reported by Cornerstone Research. *See* Cornerstone Research,  
 "Securities Class Action Settlements: 2015 Review and Analysis," at p. 8, Figure 7, *available*  
 at [www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2015-Review-and-Analysis](http://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2015-Review-and-Analysis); *see also* NERA, "Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation:  
 2015 Full-Year Review," at p. 34, Figure 30 (reporting a 0.7% median settlement value as a  
 percentage of investor losses in 2015), *available at* [www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/  
 publications/2016/2015\\_Securities\\_Trends\\_Report\\_NERA.pdf](http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/2016/2015_Securities_Trends_Report_NERA.pdf).

1 diminishing due to defense costs. Securing both the remaining available insurance proceeds, and  
 2 a substantial cash contribution from Barrett, required very careful negotiations. Plaintiffs’  
 3 Counsel had to leverage the strength of the case they had developed, but avoid depleting the  
 4 available insurance and without compromising the Company’s financial condition. Obtaining  
 5 the maximum possible amount under the circumstances was the product of Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s  
 6 experience in negotiations and strategy. DeLange Decl. ¶¶55-56. Courts recognize that  
 7 counsel’s ability to maximize recovery in the face of ability-to-pay issues demonstrates the  
 8 quality of the result achieved. *See, e.g., In re Genworth Fin. Sec. Litig.*, \_\_ F. Supp. 3d \_\_, 2016  
 9 WL 5400360, at \*5 (E.D. Va. Sept. 26, 2016) (“Balanced with the risk of losing at trial and the  
 10 risk that a greater award could result in Genworth’s insolvency, the Settlement total provides an  
 11 excellent result for the class and supports the Court’s award of substantial attorneys’ fees [of  
 12 28% of the \$219 million settlement]”); *see also In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA*  
 13 *Litig.*, 586 F. Supp. 2d 732, 791-92 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (success obtained by class counsel in face  
 14 of limited resources to fund a substantial settlement warranted 5.2 multiplier for fee request on  
 15 \$7.2 billion settlement).

16 Mediator Melnick, in his professional mediator opinion, confirms that the total  
 17 \$12 million Settlement was the most that could be obtained by Plaintiffs at the time the  
 18 Settlement was reached. Melnick Decl. ¶10.

19 **2. The Skill Required And Quality Of Plaintiffs’**  
 20 **Counsel’s Work Performed Support The Requested Fee**

21 Another factor to consider in determining what fee to award is the skill required and  
 22 quality of work performed by counsel. *See Heritage Bond*, 2005 WL 1594389, at \*12 (“The  
 23 experience of counsel is also a factor in determining the appropriate fee award.”). “The  
 24 ‘prosecution and management of a complex national class action requires unique legal skills and  
 25 abilities.’ [citation omitted]. This is particularly true in securities cases because the [PSLRA]  
 26 makes it much more difficult for securities plaintiffs to get past a motion to dismiss.”  
 27 *Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.

1 Here, respectfully, the quality of Plaintiffs' Counsel's work performed – in the face of the  
2 PSLRA's heightened pleading standard – was extremely high. As set forth in greater detail in  
3 the DeLange Declaration (Section II), Plaintiffs' Counsel extensively developed the record by,  
4 among other things:

- 5 • Performing an in-depth review and analysis of: (i) Barrett's public SEC filings;  
6 (ii) research and other reports by securities and financial analysts covering Barrett  
7 and its business; (iii) Barrett's press releases and other public statements made by  
8 or about Defendants; (iv) news articles and other media reports about Barrett;  
9 (v) transcripts of Barrett's earnings conference calls; and (vi) pricing, trading, and  
10 other data concerning Barrett common stock;
- 11 • Conducting a thorough investigation identifying and interviewing potential  
12 percipient witnesses. Six former Barrett employees provided detailed information  
13 contained in the Complaint, including a former risk manager, a former risk  
14 management consultant, two former area managers, a branch manager, and a  
15 former director of business development;
- 16 • Consulting with accounting and damages experts;
- 17 • Drafting the detailed voluminous initial consolidated complaint;
- 18 • Monitoring additional information and disclosures that were made during the  
19 litigation, resulting in Plaintiffs drafting detailed amended consolidated  
20 complaints which they believe were sufficient to overcome the PSLRA's  
21 heightened pleading standard;
- 22 • Preparing extensive briefing in response to Defendants' multiple motions to  
23 dismiss; and
- 24 • Preparing for and participating in the lengthy mediation process, including  
25 drafting Plaintiffs' mediation statements, analyzing Defendants' mediation  
26 statements, and analyzing Barrett's financial condition and ability to pay a  
27 substantial judgment, and insurance policies.

1 All three Plaintiffs' Counsel have many years of experience in litigation securities class  
 2 actions throughout the country. *See* Firm Resumes of Plaintiffs' Counsel, attached to DeLange  
 3 Decl. as Exhibits 4-A-C, 4-B-C, and 4-C-C. The attorneys at Lead Counsel Bernstein Litowitz  
 4 are among the most experienced and skilled practitioners in the securities litigation field, and the  
 5 firm has obtained recoveries on behalf of investors in securities class action litigation in this  
 6 Circuit, alone – both before and after trial – in amounts totaling over \$1 billion.<sup>4</sup> Lead Counsel's  
 7 reputation as experienced and competent counsel in complex class action cases, both willing and  
 8 able to litigate the case to resolution, facilitated Lead Counsel's ability to negotiate the  
 9 Settlement, ultimately resulting in the \$12 million recovery for the Settlement Class.

10 The quality and vigor of opposing counsel are also important in evaluating the services  
 11 rendered by Plaintiffs' Counsel. *See, e.g., Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.*, 297 F.R.D.  
 12 431, 449 (E.D. Cal. 2013). Throughout the litigation and settlement negotiations, Defendants  
 13 have been represented by very skilled and highly-respected counsel at Miller Nash Graham &  
 14 Dunn LLP (representing Barrett), Covington & Burling LLP and Groff Murphy PLLC  
 15 (representing Defendant Michael Elich), and Janet Hoffman & Associates LLC and Hillis Clark  
 16 Martin & Peterson P.S. (representing Defendant James Miller).

17 Mediator Melnick confirms that all counsel were well versed in the risks involved in the  
 18 claims and defenses in the case:

19 \_\_\_\_\_  
 20 <sup>4</sup> *See, e.g., Roberti v. OSI Sys., Inc.*, 2:13-cv-9174-MWF (C.D. Cal.) (\$15 million settlement); *In*  
 21 *re Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 08-00832-JW (N.D. Cal.) (\$173 million settlement);  
 22 *In re Connetics Sec. Litig.*, 07-02940 SI (N.D. Cal.) (\$12.75 million); *In re New Century*, 07-cv-  
 23 00931 (FMOx) (C.D. Cal.) (\$125 million); *In re Int'l Rectifier Corp. Sec. Litig.*, 07-02544-JFW  
 24 (C.D. Cal.) (\$90 million); *In re Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 02-CV-2775-MRP (C.D.  
 25 Cal.) (\$92.5 million); *In re Wells Fargo Mortg.-Backed Certificates Litig.*, 09-CV-1376-LHK  
 26 (N.D. Cal.) (\$125 million); *In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 99-CV-20743 RMW (N.D.  
 27 Cal.) (over \$1.04 billion); *In re Wash. Mut., Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 07-cv-1809 (W.D. Wash.)  
 (\$208.5 million); *In re Toyota Motor Corp. Sec. Litig.*, CV 10-922 DSF (C.D. Cal.)  
 (\$25.5 million); *In re Sunpower Sec. Litig.*, CV 09-5473-RS (N.D. Cal.) (\$19.7 million); *In re*  
*Dendreon Corp. Class Action Litig.*, C11-01291JLR (W.D. Wash.) (\$40 million); *In re Clarent*  
*Corp. Sec. Litig.*, Master File No. C-01-3361-CRB (N.D. Cal.) (obtaining plaintiff verdict at trial  
 against CEO for knowing violation of federal securities laws).

1 I found the discussions in the mediation statements and during and related to the  
 2 mediation sessions to be extremely valuable in helping me understand the relative  
 3 merits of each Party's positions, and to identify the issues that were likely to serve  
 4 as the primary drivers and obstacles to achieving a settlement. Counsel presented  
 5 significant arguments regarding their respective client's positions, and it was  
 6 apparent to me that both sides possessed strong, non-frivolous arguments, and that  
 7 neither side was assured of victory.

8 Melnick Decl. ¶9.

9 In the face of this knowledgeable and formidable defense, Plaintiffs' Counsel were  
 10 nonetheless able to develop a case that was sufficiently strong to, they believe, overcome the  
 11 heightened pleading standard of the PSLRA, and persuade Defendants, and their insurance  
 12 carriers, to settle on terms favorable to the Settlement Class.

13 **3. The Contingent Nature Of The Fee**  
 14 **And The Financial Burden Carried By**  
 15 **Plaintiffs' Counsel Support The Requested Fee**

16 The Ninth Circuit has confirmed that a determination of a fair and reasonable fee must  
 17 include consideration of the contingent nature of the fee and the obstacles surmounted in  
 18 obtaining the settlement. *See WPPSS*, 19 F.3d at 1299; *see In re Dynamic Random Access*  
 19 *Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig.*, 2007 WL 2416513, at \*1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2007); *see also*  
 20 *Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1047. It is an established practice in the private legal market to  
 21 reward attorneys for taking on the serious risk of non-payment by permitting a fee award that  
 22 reflects over their normal hourly rates for prevailing in contingency cases. *See Nuvelo*, 2011 WL  
 23 2650592, at \*2 (citing *WPPSS*, 19 F.3d at 1299). "This practice encourages the legal profession  
 24 to assume such a risk and promotes competent representation for plaintiffs who could not  
 25 otherwise hire an attorney." *Id.*

26 Here, Plaintiffs' Counsel received no compensation during the two years since the initial  
 27 complaints were filed in November 2014. During that time, Plaintiffs' Counsel invested over  
 1,886.35 hours for a total lodestar of over \$1,031,678.00, and incurred reasonable and necessary

1 expenses of \$114,823.92 in prosecuting the case. *See* Exhibits 4-A, 4-B, and 4-C, attached to the  
 2 DeLange Decl. Additional work in connection with the Settlement and claims administration  
 3 also will be required. Any fee award has always been at risk, and completely contingent on the  
 4 result achieved and on this Court’s discretion in awarding fees and expenses. Unlike defense  
 5 counsel – who typically receive payment on a timely basis whether they win or lose – Plaintiffs’  
 6 Counsel sustained the entire risk that they would have to fund the expenses of this Action and  
 7 that, unless Plaintiffs’ Counsel succeeded, they would not be entitled to any compensation  
 8 whatsoever. The contingent nature of the representation, and the burden carried by Plaintiffs’  
 9 Counsel, support the requested fee.

10 **4. The Requested Fee Is Consistent With**  
 11 **Or Less Than Awards Made In Similar Cases**

12 The requested fee of 22% is less than the Ninth Circuit’s 25% “benchmark” for common  
 13 fund cases, and below fee percentages regularly awarded in securities class action settlements in  
 14 the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere. *See, e.g., Glass*, 331 Fed. App’x at 457; *Hanlon v. Chrysler*  
 15 *Corp.*, 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998) (referring to 25% in attorneys’ fees as a “benchmark  
 16 award”); *see also Buccellato v. AT&T Operations, Inc.*, 2011 WL 3348055, at \*1 (N.D. Cal.  
 17 June 30, 2011) (recognizing Ninth Circuit’s 25% benchmark, surveying cases and granting 25%  
 18 fee award). Indeed, “in most common fund cases, the award exceeds that benchmark.”  
 19 *Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1047-48; *see also Activision*, 723 F. Supp. at 1377-78 (surveying  
 20 securities cases nationwide and noting, “[t]his court’s review of recent reported cases discloses  
 21 that nearly all common fund awards range around 30%”).

22 Courts have repeatedly awarded fees of 25% or more – more than the 22% requested here  
 23 – where a settlement was reached during the pendency of a motion to dismiss or shortly after,  
 24 and where no or very limited formal discovery had been obtained as a result of the PSLRA  
 25 discovery stay. *See, e.g., Glass*, 331 Fed. App’x at 457 (affirming award of 25% where  
 26 settlement reached early, noting “the favorable timing of the settlement”); *In re Int’l Rectifier*  
 27 *Corp. Sec. Litig.*, CV 07-02544-JFW (C.D. Cal.), ECF No. 316 (granting fee award of 25% of



1 settlement fund obtained in securities class action prior to substantial formal discovery); *Oh v.*  
 2 *Chan*, CV 07-04891 DDP (C.D. Cal.), ECF No. 99 (granting fees equaling 25% of settlement  
 3 fund obtained in securities class action prior to a ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss).  
 4 Courts have commended class counsel for recognizing when, as in this case, a prompt resolution  
 5 of the matter is in the best interests of the class. *See Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 2007 WL  
 6 221862, at \*15 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) ("Class counsel achieved an excellent result for the  
 7 class members by settling the instant action promptly."), *aff'd*, 331 Fed. App'x at 457.

8 Indeed, one of the merits of awarding fees on a percentage basis is that it does not  
 9 penalize attorneys for achieving a prompt resolution of a case, where, as here, sufficient  
 10 information about the value of the claims could be determined through investigation and careful  
 11 analysis of the legal and factual issues, thus avoiding the need for costly and lengthy formal  
 12 discovery. *See Aichele v. City of Los Angeles*, 2015 WL 5286028, at \*5 (C.D. Cal.  
 13 Sept. 9, 2015) ("Many courts and commentators have recognized that the percentage of the  
 14 available fund analysis is the preferred approach in class action fee requests because it more  
 15 closely aligns the interests of the counsel and the class, *i.e.*, class counsel directly benefit from  
 16 increasing the size of the class fund and working in the most efficient manner.") (citing *Vizcaino*,  
 17 290 F.3d at 1050 n.5 ("it is widely recognized that the lodestar method creates incentives for  
 18 counsel to expend more hours than may be necessary on litigating a case so as to recover a  
 19 reasonable fee, since the lodestar method does not reward early settlement.")).

20 **5. The Reaction Of The Settlement**  
 21 **Class Supports The Requested Fee**

22 The reaction of the class to a proposed settlement and fee request is a relevant factor in  
 23 approving fees. *See Knight v. Red Door Salons*, 2009 WL 248367, at \*7 (N.D. Cal.  
 24 Feb. 2, 2009); *Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1048. Here, pursuant to the Court's Preliminary  
 25 Approval Order, beginning on November 21, 2016, the Court-approved Notice was disseminated  
 26 to more than 22,899 potential Settlement Class Members and their brokers and nominees, and the  
 27 Summary Notice was published in the *Investor's Business Daily* and over the *PR Newswire* on

1 November 28, 2016. *See* Bareither Decl. ¶¶2-12. The Notice informed Settlement Class  
 2 Members that Lead Counsel would seek fees in an amount not to exceed 22% of the Settlement  
 3 Amount, and reimbursement of Litigation Expenses in an amount not to exceed \$400,000. *See*  
 4 Exhibit A to the Bareither Decl., ¶¶5, 67. The Notice further advised Settlement Class Members  
 5 of, among other things, their right to object to Lead Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees and  
 6 Litigation Expenses. To date, there are no objections, further supporting the requested fee. *See*,  
 7 *e.g.*, *Red Door Salons*, 2009 WL 248367, at \*7 (no objection supports 30% award); *Omnivision*,  
 8 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1048 (only three objections supports 28% award).

9 **6. A Lodestar Crosscheck Confirms**  
 10 **That The Requested Fee Is Reasonable**

11 Although courts in this Circuit typically apply the percentage approach to determine  
 12 attorneys’ fees in common fund cases, courts may perform an informal lodestar cross-check on  
 13 the percentage method. *See Glass*, 2007 WL 221862, at \*16 (“Under the circumstances  
 14 presented here, where the early settlement resulted in a significant benefit to the class, the Court  
 15 finds no need to conduct a lodestar cross-check.”), *aff’d*, 331 Fed. App’x at 456-57 (“In  
 16 reviewing the award of attorneys’ fees, the district court properly performed an informal lodestar  
 17 cross-check, and noted the relatively low time-commitment by plaintiff’s counsel”; affirming  
 18 district court’s 25% fee award over objection).

19 In *Vizcaino*, the Ninth Circuit noted that as follows:

20 “[C]ourts have routinely enhanced the lodestar to reflect the risk of non-payment  
 21 in common fund cases. . . . This mirrors the established practice in the private legal  
 22 market of rewarding attorneys for taking the risk of nonpayment by paying them a  
 23 premium over their normal hourly rates for winning contingency cases.” . . . In  
 24 common fund cases, “attorneys whose compensation depends on their winning  
 25 the case[] must make up in compensation in the cases they win for the lack of  
 26 compensation in the cases they lose.”

1 290 F.3d at 1051 (citation omitted). There, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a fee award that equaled  
 2 28% of the settlement fund and a multiplier of 3.65, which the court found to be “within the  
 3 range of multipliers applied in common fund cases.” *Id.* In cases applying the lodestar method,  
 4 fee “multipliers of between 3 and 4.5 have been common.” *Rabin v. Concord Assets Grp., Inc.*,  
 5 1991 WL 275757, at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 1991) (multiplier of 4.4) (citation omitted); *Van*  
 6 *Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co.*, 901 F. Supp. 294, 298 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Multipliers in the 3-4  
 7 range are common in lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.”).

8 As detailed herein and in the accompanying DeLange Declaration, the work Plaintiffs’  
 9 Counsel performed in this matter wholly supports the Court’s approval of a fee award of 22% of  
 10 the Settlement Amount, or \$2.64 million.<sup>5</sup> Plaintiffs’ Counsel devoted 1,886.35 hours to this  
 11 Action, amounting to a lodestar of \$1,031,678.00.<sup>6</sup> Thus, Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s fee request  
 12 represents a modest multiplier of approximately 2.5 of Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s total lodestar.

13 In sum, Lead Counsel’s attorneys’ fee request is below the Ninth Circuit’s “benchmark”  
 14 and, whether calculated as a percentage of the Settlement Fund or in relation to Plaintiffs’  
 15 Counsel’s lodestar, is fair and reasonable and warrants the Court’s approval.

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17  
 18 <sup>5</sup> As is customary in seeking a percentage-of-the-fund award in common fund cases and  
 19 submitting data for a lodestar cross-check, included with Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s declarations are  
 20 schedules identifying the lodestar of each firm (by individual, position, billing rate, and time  
 21 billed). *See, e.g., In re ECotality, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 2015 WL 5117618, at \*4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28,  
 22 2015) (“The lodestar crosscheck calculation need entail neither mathematical precision nor bean  
 counting . . . . [courts] may rely on summaries submitted by the attorneys and need not review  
 actual billing records.”). Unlike the full lodestar method, when conducting a lodestar  
 crosscheck, “the hours documented by counsel need not be exhaustively scrutinized by the  
 district court.” *In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 388 F. Supp. 2d 319, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

23 <sup>6</sup> *See* DeLange Decl. ¶80 and Exhibits 4-A, 4-B, and 4-C. Lead Counsel’s rates are set in accord  
 24 with the national market for securities class action litigation, both on the plaintiff side and the  
 25 defense side. Based on our review of publicly-available information in court filings and data  
 26 compilations, our rates are aligned with the rates of the national market for defense firms that  
 27 defend securities class actions and other plaintiff firms that specialize in large and complex  
 securities litigation. *See, e.g., National Law Journal, “Billing Rates Across the Country”* (Jan.  
 13, 2014), available at [http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202636785489/Billing-Rates-  
 Across-the-Country](http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202636785489/Billing-Rates-Across-the-Country).

1 **III. PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL'S EXPENSES ARE REASONABLE**

2 Lead Counsel also requests reimbursement of Plaintiffs' Counsel's Litigation Expenses in  
 3 the total amount of \$114,823.92 incurred in prosecuting and resolving the Action on behalf of  
 4 the Settlement Class. Attorneys who create a common fund for the benefit of a class are entitled  
 5 to be reimbursed for their out-of-pocket expenses incurred in creating the fund so long as the  
 6 submitted expenses are reasonable, necessary and directly related to the prosecution of the  
 7 action. *See Omnivision*, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1048 ("Attorneys may recover their reasonable  
 8 expenses that would typically be billed to paying clients in non-contingency matters.").

9 From the outset, Plaintiffs' Counsel were aware that they might not recover any of their  
 10 expenses or, at the very least, would not recover anything until the Action was successfully  
 11 resolved. Plaintiffs' Counsel also understood that, even if the case was ultimately successful,  
 12 reimbursement for expenses would not compensate them for the lost use of funds advanced to  
 13 prosecute the Action. Thus, Plaintiffs' Counsel were motivated to, and did, take significant steps  
 14 to minimize expenses wherever practicable without jeopardizing the vigorous and efficient  
 15 prosecution of the Action. *See DeLange Decl.* ¶94.

16 The Plaintiffs' Counsel's expenses sought for reimbursement are detailed in the  
 17 accompanying sworn declarations of Plaintiffs' Counsel at Exhibits 4-A, 4-B, and 4-C to the  
 18 DeLange Declaration, setting forth the specific category of expenses incurred and the amount.  
 19 The types of expenses for which reimbursement is sought are necessarily incurred in litigation  
 20 and routinely charged to clients billed by the hour. These include expenses associated with,  
 21 among other things, online legal and factual research, travel, experts and consultants, and  
 22 mediation. *See, e.g., Vincent*, 2013 WL 621865, at \*5 (granting reimbursement of costs and  
 23 expenses for "three experts and the mediator, photocopying and mailing expenses, travel  
 24 expenses, and other reasonable litigation related expenses"); *Red Door Salons*, 2009 WL  
 25 248367, at \*7 (granting reimbursement because "[a]ttorneys routinely bill clients for all of these  
 26 expenses").  
 27

1 A large component of Plaintiffs' Counsel's expenses, approximately 60%, is for the cost  
 2 of experts and consultants with significant experience analyzing accounting, damages, and loss  
 3 causation in securities class actions. In prosecuting the claims, Plaintiffs' Counsel necessarily  
 4 worked extensively with experts and consultants. *See* DeLange Decl. ¶96.

5 The expenses also include mediation costs of \$30,628.59, and the costs of online research  
 6 in the total amount of \$6,228.80. These are the charges for computerized factual and legal  
 7 research services such as *LexisNexis*, *Westlaw*, and PACER. *Id.* ¶97. It is standard practice for  
 8 attorneys to use these resources to assist them in researching legal and factual issues; these tools  
 9 create efficiencies in litigation and, ultimately, save clients and the class money.

10 The Notice informed potential Settlement Class Members that Lead Counsel would  
 11 apply, on behalf of Plaintiffs' Counsel, for reimbursement of Litigation Expenses in an amount  
 12 not to exceed \$400,000. *See* Exhibit A to the Bareither Decl., ¶¶5, 67. The amount of expenses  
 13 for which reimbursement is now sought, \$114,823.92, is less than one-third of the maximum  
 14 amount stated in the Notice. To date, no Settlement Class Member has objected.

15 **IV. CONCLUSION**

16 Lead Counsel respectfully requests that the Court award attorneys' fees in the amount of  
 17 22% of the Settlement Amount, and reimbursement of Plaintiffs' Counsel's Litigation Expenses  
 18 in the amount of \$114,823.92, plus interest earned at the same rate and for the same time period  
 19 as the Settlement Fund, to be paid from the Settlement Fund.

20 For the Court's convenience, following the objection deadline, Lead Counsel will submit  
 21 with its Reply papers a proposed Order awarding attorneys' fees and Litigation Expenses.

22 Dated: January 18, 2017

Respectfully submitted,

23 By: /s/ Bradley S. Keller

24 Bradley S. Keller, WSBA # 10665

25 BYRNES KELLER CROMWELL LLP

1000 Second Avenue, 38<sup>th</sup> Floor

Seattle, WA 98104

26 Tel: (206) 622-2000

27 Fax: (206) 622-2522

1 Email: bkeller@byrneskeller.com

2 *Liaison Counsel for Lead Plaintiff Painters & Allied*  
3 *Trades District Council No. 35 Pension and Annuity Funds*

4 BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER  
5 & GROSSMANN LLP

6 Timothy A. DeLange (*pro hac vice*)

7 Niki L. Mendoza (*pro hac vice*)

8 12481 High Bluff Drive, Suite 300

9 San Diego, CA 92130

10 Tel: (858) 793-0070

11 Fax: (858) 793-0323

12 Email: timothyd@blbglaw.com

13 nikim@blbglaw.com

14 *Counsel for Lead Plaintiff Painters & Allied Trades*  
15 *District Council No. 35 Pension and Annuity Funds and*  
16 *Lead Counsel for the Settlement Class*

17 WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER FREEMAN  
18 & HERZ LLP

19 Gregory M. Nespole

20 270 Madison Avenue

21 New York, NY 10016

22 Tel: (212) 545-4600

23 Fax: (212) 545-4653

24 Email: nespole@whafh.com

25 *Counsel for Named Plaintiff Bakers Local No. 433*  
26 *Pension Fund*

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned attorney certifies that on the 18th day of January, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all counsel on record in the matter.

/s/ Bradley S. Keller  
Byrnes Keller Cromwell LLP  
1000 Second Avenue, 38th Floor  
Seattle, WA 98104  
Telephone: (206) 622-2000  
Facsimile: (206) 622-2522  
bkeller@byrneskeller.com